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Abstract. This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with 
a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public 
discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mis-
takenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of 
academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are 
ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose pur-
pose isn’t just to protect the speech of academics, but also to give them the prerogative to 
determine which views and speakers have sufficient disciplinary credentials to receive a 
hearing in academic contexts. No platforming should therefore be acceptable to liberals, 
in principle, in cases where it is used to support a university culture that maintains rig-
orous disciplinary standards, by denying attention and credibility to speakers without 
appropriate disciplinary credentials. 
 
1. Introduction 
No platforming is the practice of blocking, or attempting to block, an individual 
from speaking at a university because of her expressed moral or political views. It 
is different from merely protesting a speaker. Protest typically serves to com-
municate disagreement. It is a form of communication that is compatible with 
liberal ideals of free speech and tolerance, at least in theory.1 By contrast, no plat-
forming generally expresses the view that the targeted person is morally or polit-
ically beyond the pale, and that they should thus be denied a voice on campus. On 
                                                 
1 There are borderline cases in which a protest is intended to be so disruptive that it stops a speaker from 
speaking or being heard. Such protests might plausibly be characterized as instances no platforming. 
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its face, no platforming is a practice that seems to be at odds with a liberal poli-
tics. 
Our aim in this paper is to explore whether, contrary to these appearances, no 
platforming can be reconciled with liberal ideals. In §2 we say more about the 
nature of no platforming and the standard liberal case against it. In §3 we explain 
why an appeal to the harm principle, as a limiting constraint on free speech, isn’t 
a promising strategy for reconciling no platforming with liberalism. In §4 we pro-
pose an alternative. Following Robert Post and others, we distinguish principles 
of academic freedom, which answer to the epistemic and intellectual aims of the 
university, from the wider free speech principles that govern the liberal public 
square. On this account, the content-based suppression of viewpoints by disci-
plinary gatekeepers isn’t merely permissible, but positively desirable – indeed, it 
stands in need of special protection. In §5 we consider whether some forms of no 
platforming might be acceptable to liberals, given a defence of the practice built 
around this conception of academic freedom. We identify some instances of no 
platforming that seem like they would be acceptable, and others that wouldn’t. 
We then consider some hard cases, in particular, cases in which the prerogatives 
of disciplinary gatekeepers are contested, due to controversy about the scope and 
boundaries of disciplinary expertise. We finish by sketching a more radical way 
to adapt Post’s account in a defence of no platforming, one which allows that stu-
dents, rather than only faculty members, may sometimes have a legitimate role to 
play in the formation of disciplinary standards. 
Before going further, we should note that we do not believe, nor mean to suggest, 
that a satisfactory defence of no platforming must be situated within a liberal po-
litical framework. We are asking how liberals can defend no platforming mainly 
because those who critique the practice typically do so by appealing to various 
tenets of liberalism. Our aim is to see whether no platforming really is at logger-
heads with liberalism, as its most vocal critics claim. 
 
2. No platforming: then and now 
The term ‘no platforming’ dates to the 1970s, when the UK National Union of 
Students (NUS) adopted a policy under that name, prohibiting student unions 
from giving representatives of the fascist National Front party access to speaking 
engagements on British university campuses. Over time the NUS’s targeted cam-
paign was applied to a wider range of speakers, espousing a variety of unpopular 
views, including racist, anti-Semitic, misogynistic, Islamophobic, and transpho-
bic views. Recent targets of no platforming in the UK include the MP George 
Galloway, over allegations of rape denial,2 Iranian human rights campaigner and 
                                                 
2 Galloway said on a podcast that the sexual crimes of which Julian Assange has been accused “don’t 
constitute rape” and are at worst “bad sexual etiquette”; see Rickman (2012) further discussion.  
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secularist Maryam Namazie, for Islamophobia,3 psychologist Ken Zucker, for 
transphobia,4 and feminists Julie Bindel, Beatrix Campbell, and Germaine Greer, 
also for transphobia.5 
In the US there has been a parallel rise in the practice of disinvitation, which in-
volves student groups reacting to someone’s invitation to speak on campus, e.g. 
for a commencement address, by pressuring the administration to rescind the in-
vitation, or pressuring the speaker to decline it. The Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education (FIRE) lists 342 disinvitation campaigns at American col-
leges since 2000.6 Recent examples of people targeted for disinvitation by left-
wing activists include former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, for war 
crimes, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, for anti-black racism, anti-
FGM campaigner Ayaan Hirsi Ali, for Islamophobia, and Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, for human rights abuses. Disinvitation campaigns have also 
sometimes been mounted by conservative groups, targeting people like Angela 
Davis for anti-capitalist views, or Cornel West for criticism of Israel. Disinvita-
tion and no platforming aren’t identical – they differ in how they are organized 
and what kinds of speakers they are used against – but they are similar in certain 
key respects. Most importantly, they are both tools primarily used by students: 
an attempt to exert control from below over who speaks and what can be said on 
campus. Whatever the weight of the differences amounts to, we will treat disin-
vitation as a species of no platforming. 
At face value these practices seem to flout liberal ideals of tolerance, pluralism, 
and open public discourse. One could argue that that was not the case when no 
platforming was first being used by the NUS as a tactic for combating the Na-
tional Front. In those days one might have viewed the practice as a permissible 
form of militant liberalism: a special exception to the normal liberal commitment 
to tolerance, aimed specifically at combating the rise of political groups whose 
overt aims included the abolition of liberal institutions. However, as a number of 
critics argue, the practice of no platforming isn’t what it used to be (e.g. Ditum 
2014). Nowadays, so the critique goes, no platforming is used not just to fight 
against overt enemies of liberal society, but to suppress credible positions that 
are widely accepted by reasonable, sincere, and informed people. If no platform-
ing was still reserved for the National Front, it could arguably be reconciled with 
a liberal vision of the university. But given that it is used to silence a wide range 
                                                 
3 Namazie is a member of the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain, and a spokesperson for ‘One Law for All’, 
which campaigns against sharia and other religious laws. The decision to no platform her at Warwick 
University was later reversed after student and public outcry; see Adams (2015). 
4 Zucker promotes therapeutic intervention for children who exhibit gender non-conforming behaviour. 
5 For further discussion see National Union of Students (2016). 
6 As of September 2017; see https://www.thefire.org/resources/disinvitation-database/. Note that FIRE 
includes both actual and attempted disinvitation, and “substantial event disruption” cases in its database 
(cf. note 1). Some of its cases may arguably be better classified as protest rather than no platforming. 
4 
 
of viewpoints and speakers – including human rights campaigners, feminists, 
medical doctors, and mainstream politicians – it appears to have broken faith 
with that vision. 
Granted, some practitioners of no platforming expressly reject liberal ideals. It is 
a familiar leftist critique, after all, that liberalism colludes in oppression: in its 
focus on individual negative liberty, its insistence on a distinction between the 
public and private realms, and its idealization of the public square as a place of 
reasoned deliberation.7 Allowing advocates of oppressive ideas a platform on 
campus, in the name of free speech, might be seen as yet another deployment of 
liberal ideals in the service of injustice and domination. In turn, no platforming 
might be seen as an organized mode of resistance to the abuse of liberal ideals for 
oppressive ends. Those who take this view may invoke Herbert Marcuse’s warn-
ing that – in the non-ideal conditions of actual political contestation – an ethos 
of ‘indiscriminate tolerance’ won’t result in the triumph of truth, as Millian liber-
als hope, but instead, the triumph of views favored by the powerful. In such cir-
cumstances, and “where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake”, he says 
Certain things cannot be said, certain ideas cannot be expressed, certain pol-
icies cannot be proposed, certain behavior cannot be permitted without mak-
ing tolerance an instrument for the continuation of servitude (Marcuse 1965: 
88) 
There are those who believe that political discourse in the university is yet an-
other discursive arena in which entrenched power hierarchies thwart the positive 
aims that – for Millian liberals – tolerance is supposed to promote. No platform-
ing may be defended, by people in this camp, as a necessary means of curbing the 
repressive consequences of liberal tolerance.8 
Naturally, classical liberals regard this sort of militancy as a mortal threat to free-
dom, and tend to view no platforming as a dangerous manifestation of this stance. 
In a recent critique of the disinvitation trend, Greg Lukianoff, the President of 
                                                 
7 For examples of these claims in feminist discourse, see Catharine MacKinnon’s claim that liberal con-
ceptions of harm make the harm done by pornography to women uncognizable (1984); the claim ad-
vanced by Angela Davis (1981), Carol Pateman (1988), Susan Okin (1989), and Nancy Fraser (2014) that 
the liberal notion of a protected ‘private’ sphere obscures injustice in the family; or Alison Jaggar’s (1993) 
and Iris Marion Young’s (1997) claims that the idealizations involved in liberal conceptions of public dis-
course systematically exclude the perspectives of those who are taken to be discursively non-ideal. 
8 Marcuse himself would not have wanted his ideas to be co-opted in a defence of no platforming. Leading 
up to the passage we have quoted, Marcuse identifies ‘academic discussion’ as one of a few arenas in 
which an ethos of indiscriminate tolerance is justified. Marcuse thinks that in the special social condi-
tions of academic discussion, such tolerance typically does conduce to the utilitarian benefits that Mill 
adverts to in his defence of free speech in On Liberty; thus academic discussion represents an exception to 
Marcuse’s rule. But regardless of Marcuse’s optimism about the consequences of tolerance for scholarly 
inquiry, it is easy to imagine a version of his critique which is less sanguine about the effects of power on 
the truth-seeking aims of academic discourse. For further discussion of the nuances of Marcuse’s account, 
see Leiter (2017) and David Estlund, “When Protest and Speech Collide” (in this volume). 
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FIRE, writes that higher education “is an institution that relies on being a mar-
ketplace of ideas” (2014: 12), and he exhorts students to embrace the value of ep-
istemic humility – “a fancy way of saying that we must always keep in mind that 
we could be wrong or, at least, that we can always learn something from listening 
to the other side” (Ibid: 6). The popular conservative commentators Mary 
Katharine Ham and Guy Benson strike similar notes in their discussion of the 
topic, decrying the trend of colleges “capitulating to howling mobs”, and insisting 
on the importance of a free marketplace of ideas in university culture (Ham and 
Benson 2015: 119ff.).9 We will say more about these sorts of views in what follows. 
For now, our point is just that it is quite straightforward to formulate an inter-
nally coherent defence of no platforming that is premised on a rejection of the 
liberal vision espoused by people like Lukianoff. Indeed, this kind of anti-liberal 
case for no platforming probably captures the attitude or perspective of some pro-
ponents of no platforming. Nevertheless, the task that is more interesting – or at 
least more dialectically useful, given how critiques of the practice are typically 
framed – is to see if there is a way to defend no platforming within the parameters 
of a liberal politics. This is especially true because liberal critics of no platforming, 
in their routine invocation of free speech principles, tend to neglect a crucial fact: 
the academy is not the public square, and is in fact by its very nature an institu-
tion in which content-based speech discrimination is the norm. But before we 
turn to the question of how liberals should think of the academy, and the place of 
no platforming within it, let us say something about the debate between critics 
and defenders of no platforming as it standardly plays out. 
 
3. Invoking the harm principle 
It might appear that the most promising way of defending no platforming within 
a liberal framework is by appeal to something like the harm principle, as a limit-
ing constraint on individual liberty in general and free speech specifically. The 
recent controversy over the attempted no platforming of Germaine Greer pro-
vides a useful example of how the harm principle can structure debate around 
this issue. In 2015 Greer was invited to give a public lecture at Cardiff University. 
The advertised title for the lecture was ‘Women & Power: The Lessons of the 
20th Century’. Greer’s lecture was cancelled, however, after a student-authored 
petition gathered over 3000 signatures demanding that the university rescind her 
invitation.10 The petition argued that Greer had “demonstrated time and time 
                                                 
9 There is a cottage industry of texts – dating back to Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987) 
– lamenting the allegedly illiberal, allegedly conformist, left-wing ideology of contemporary American 
higher education. Prominent texts in this vein include Kimball (1990) and D’Souza (1991); Lukianoff and 
Haidt (2015) is a recent and widely-read piece carrying on certain themes in this lineage. 
10 See https://www.change.org/p/cardiff-university-do-not-host-germaine-greer. 
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again her misogynistic views towards trans women, including continually mis-
gendering trans women and denying the existence of transphobia altogether.” It 
said such views “should have no place in feminism or society”, and that they con-
tribute to “hatred and violence towards trans people – particularly trans women 
– both in the UK and across the world”. While paying respect to the idea that 
debate in a university should be allowed and encouraged, the petition nonethe-
less insisted that it would be unacceptably dangerous to host “a speaker with 
such problematic and hateful views towards marginalised and vulnerable 
groups”. 
There was a strong counter-campaign defending Greer’s right to speak at Cardiff, 
which included an open letter in The Guardian signed by several prominent femi-
nists, including Beatrix Campbell, Lisa Appignanesi, Catherine Hall, Sue O’Sulli-
van, and the Southall Black Sisters. The letter objected that where no platforming 
“used to be a tactic used against self-proclaimed fascists and Holocaust-deniers”, 
now it is used “to prevent the expression of feminist arguments critical of the sex 
industry and of some demands made by trans activists”. The letter’s signatories 
objected to the suggestion that the mere presence of anyone holding views that 
conflict with trans activists’ claims about sex and gender “is a threat to a pro-
tected minority group’s safety”, especially given that Greer and other feminists 
with similar views “have never advocated or engaged in violence against any 
group of people”.11 
The signatories to this letter and the signatories to the no platforming petition 
clearly disagreed about whether Greer’s lecture should have been allowed to go 
ahead. But both sides located their competing claims within a similar normative 
framework. They agreed that there is a prima facie right to free speech on campus, 
while also agreeing that this right can be overridden to prevent serious harm, e.g. 
to prevent the incitement of violence against a vulnerable social group. The piv-
otal issue in the Greer debate, then, was whether there really was a threat of vio-
lence against trans women, stemming from Greer’s claims about gender, and 
whatever amplification of those claims might have resulted from her speaking at 
Cardiff. The pivotal question was: would Greer’s lecture have genuinely endan-
gered trans women? 
It is unsurprising that all sides in the Greer controversy would adopt this norma-
tive framing. Standard liberal thinking tells us that the expression of ideas and 
opinions should be free from coercive institutional restriction, but also that there 
are exceptions for speech that is seriously harmful or carries an imminent risk of 
harm. This view is partly rooted in the harm principle – the idea famously es-
poused by Mill that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others” (Mill 1863: 23). It is also partly rooted in doctrinal themes from incitement 
                                                 
11 See https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2015/feb/14/letters-censorship. 
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law, in particular the idea that inflammatory or provocative speech should be free 
from regulation unless it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action”.12 Together, these two ideas make sense of the apparent points of agree-
ment in the debate around Greer’s no platforming: first, that there is a prima facie 
entitlement to free speech on university campuses, and second, that this entitle-
ment can justifiably be overridden given a threat of significant harm. 
But there are complexities lurking beneath the surface. For Mill, limits to free 
speech governed by the harm principle are compatible with a substantial sphere 
of personal liberty in ‘self-regarding action’. These things are compatible, Mill 
thinks, because much of our speech is purely self-regarding and thus harmless; 
harm to others is only a danger in areas where speech transforms from mere opin-
ion into some kind of verbal conduct. (His classic example: when said in front of an 
angry mob gathered outside a corn dealer’s house, the opinion that corn dealers 
are starvers of the poor becomes an act of incitement (Mill 1863: 107-08).) This 
neat distinction between mere speech and dangerous verbal conduct starts to 
look tenuous on inspection, though. All communicative acts – even those that just 
involve the expression of opinions – have some potential to negatively affect oth-
ers in some respects. If any sphere of expressive liberty is to be preserved, then, 
we will have to insist that only certain kinds of harms suffice to justify the regu-
lation of speech, and we will have to specify which ones.13 We will probably also 
need to protect some forms of especially high-value expression against regulation, 
even when the harm of doing so sometimes outweighs the immediate benefit.14 
And we will also need to formulate distinctions between influence, persuasion, 
and incitement, in order to decide exactly when communicative acts can be as-
cribed responsibility for harmful outcomes on which they have had an upstream 
                                                 
12 This phrase is the formulation used to characterize regulable inflammatory speech under the landmark 
US Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which superseded the more ambiguous 
“clear and present” danger rule that had previously marked out the limits on inflammatory speech for 
First Amendment purposes. American jurisprudence has a significant influence on thinking about free 
speech principles throughout Anglophone legal theory, but its doctrinal principles should not be taken 
as universal. In the UK, for instance, incitement was a common law offence until 2008, before being su-
perseded as a statutory offence (the offence of ‘assisting crime’) under the Serious Crime Act 2007. For 
legal scholars in the UK, the question of how to balance free speech with the regulation of inflammatory 
speech has generally been framed with reference to these common law and statutory offences. 
13 For instance, we will have to consider precisely which kinds of negative psychological or mental effects 
are sufficient to justify the regulation of communicative behavior (see Brison 1998). 
14 Such protections are a hallmark of American free speech jurisprudence. For instance, the ruling in Snyder 
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), which examined the right of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to 
picket a soldier’s funeral, suggested that Phelps’s protesting would be allowed regardless of the pain it 
causes others (Schauer 2011: 87-90). Of course, it verges on the absurd to imagine that no costs, however 
catastrophic, are sufficient to justify the regulation of high-value speech, like protest or investigative jour-
nalism. But it is consistent with allowing that these forms of speech can be regulated to avert a catastro-
phe, to maintain that they cannot be regulated in the normal run of cases, based on a mere cost-benefit 
calculation. In this respect, free speech rights are formally similar to nearly all moral or legal rights, in 
that they aren’t treated as being infinitely stringent (see Nagel 1995).  
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causal influence. After all, if all communicative acts can be accorded responsibil-
ity for any harmful outcomes that result from the actions of other people who 
come under their influence, only a meagre realm of expressive liberty will be left. 
So standard liberal claims about harm to others, as a limiting constraint on free 
speech, need to be accompanied by a distinction between acceptable negative in-
fluence and unacceptable incitement. But it isn’t obvious how this distinction 
should be drawn, or whether it can be anything more than arbitrary.15 
Given these complexities, it will be difficult to defend the practice no platforming 
via an appeal to harm-prevention without begging some important questions. At 
each turn in the debate – in claiming that the speech would result in negative 
effects that qualify as bona fide harms, in claiming that the speaker is responsible 
for these harms, and in assuming that the speech in question isn’t of a specially 
protected kind such that it should be permitted even if it is harmful – a contro-
versial stance is being taken. And in order to be used in a defence of no platform-
ing, these stances will need to be defended in the face of deep-rooted political 
opposition. 
Consider the attempt to no platform Maryam Namazie by the Student Union at 
the University of Warwick. Union officials defended their campaign by appealing 
to their “duty of care” to students, noting that Namazie had authored articles that 
were “highly inflammatory” and which “could incite hatred on campus”. They 
spoke of “the right of Muslim students not to feel intimidated or discriminated 
against on their university campus”. Two kinds of claims are being made here: (i) 
that Muslim students who hear Namazie’s speech may be directly harmed, in feel-
ing intimidated or discriminated against, and (ii) that all Muslim students at 
Warwick may be indirectly harmed due to Namazie’s speech inflaming hatred 
towards them. Notice how this echoes the charges raised against Greer at Cardiff, 
with claims about a danger to the immediate audience, but also a contribution to 
wider patterns of discrimination. Substantiating these sorts of claims is a difficult 
task, though. First, consider the claim that Namazie’s speech would inflict a di-
rect harm sufficient to justify its restriction. To assert this claim one must defend 
a stance on several contested questions, about which harms suffice to justify the 
regulation of political speech. For instance: is merely feeling intimidated or dis-
criminated against sufficient? If so, is it sufficient in every case, or only when the 
feeling is reasonable given what the speaker has said? And if the latter, what gives 
content to our notion of reasonableness?16 Second, consider the indirect harms to 
the community, beyond Namazie’s immediate audience, that would allegedly 
                                                 
15 One appealing approach, favored by authors like Scanlon (1972) and Strauss (1991), is to say that nega-
tive effects that result from the persuasive influence of communicative acts cannot be invoked to justify the 
restriction of those acts. But as several authors have argued (e.g. Scoccia 1996), the boundaries between 
persuasion, influence, indoctrination, incitement, provocation, and so on, are hard to draw in any princi-
pled way. 
16 For discussion of these questions see for instance Husak (2006) and Simester and von Hirsch (2011). 
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have resulted from her speech. Substantiating this allegation requires one to de-
fend a stance on the question of when a speaker is responsible for the influence 
her speech has on her audience. For instance: does the harmful influence have to 
be foreseeable, or intended, or neither? And if neither, is the speaker responsible 
for harmful outcomes that result from implausible interpretations of her ex-
pressed views? If so: in all cases? And if not: what are the exceptions?17 
The point of raising these questions is not to assert that defenders of no platform-
ing – in the Namazie case, or any other – cannot propose answers that would 
substantiate their claims in principle. The point is that such answers will be con-
troversial, on both theoretical and empirical fronts, and that when these answers 
are offered to defend a specific instance of no platforming, they’re likely to be ac-
cepted only by people whose political commitments already dispose them to fa-
vor the no platforming of the speaker. Granted, there are argumentative resources 
that can be recruited by the defender of no platforming: accounts aiming to show 
that various kinds of ‘mere feelings’ are in fact sufficiently harmful to justify the 
regulation of political speech (e.g. Brison 1998), that communicative practices do 
play a key role in perpetuating identity-based oppression (e.g. McGowan 2009), 
and that certain ‘accidental’ or unintended types of incitement to violence should 
be liable to regulation (e.g. Lidsky 2002). But the dialectical efficacy of these ar-
gumentative resources is limited in the context of this debate. None of these ac-
counts represent settled or widely-shared moral, political, or legal judgments. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether supporters of no platforming would themselves 
be willing to endorse the kinds of claims about responsibility for indirect harm 
that would have to be invoked in order to support a general harm-based rationale 
for no platforming speakers with potential negative influences. If Greer’s claims 
about gender can be assigned blame for violence against trans women, of a level 
sufficient to justify her no platforming, then why couldn’t economists who de-
nounce progressive welfare programs also be assigned blame (and no platformed) 
over the deprivations suffered by the poor due to the regressive welfare reforms 
they promote? In both cases the speaker endorses, and thus presumably contrib-
utes to the influence of, a set of views that bears a causal connection to egregious 
harms visited upon vulnerable people. Perhaps defenders of no platforming will 
say that it is an aberration that opponents of progressive welfare aren’t targeted 
by no platforming campaigns – that these scholars and pundits should indeed be 
no platformed. But then the worry is that this view collapses, in practice, into a 
rationale that all sides can invoke in order to try to exclude their opponents from 
academic platforms by appealing to ideologically-affiliated claims about the 
                                                 
17 For discussion of these issues see for instance Alexander (2000), Goodall (2007), and Barendt (2009). 
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harms that their opponents’ views bring about. Insofar as defenders of no plat-
forming want to resist this charge, they have reason to avoid making these sorts 
of controversial claims about indirect harm.18 
In summary, there are reasons to doubt that an attempted general defence of no 
platforming via appeal to the harm principle will be either theoretically persua-
sive or politically successful. Moreover, the use of this argumentative approach 
leaves advocates of no platforming open to the charge that the practice really isn’t 
about preventing harm at all – that their appeal to this purely procedural liberal 
precept is really just a cover for the kind of illiberal, repressive purposes we dis-
cussed in §2, of making disapproved opinions ideologically verboten.19 
None of this rests on the so-called ‘sticks and stones’ view, that all speech is be-
nign and harmless (e.g. critiqued by Schauer 1993, Brison 1998). While there is 
ongoing debate about how communicative factors interact with other historical 
and material factors to sustain oppressive social conditions (e.g. see Fraser and 
Honneth 2003), it is plausible that communicative factors at least play some non-
trivial role. And moreover, there are various types of communicative acts – verbal 
harassment and threats, for instance – that can be restricted under a harm-pre-
vention rationale in a way that is uncontroversially compatible with a liberal pol-
itics. In short, nothing in what we’re saying is opposed to the view that some 
communicative acts are genuinely harmful.20 Our point is that in order to defend 
no platforming via a harm-prevention rationale, this view has to be combined 
with further claims – about responsibility, the nature of harm, and the scope of 
expressive liberties – that can only underwrite a successful defence of no plat-
forming if the contested questions are settled in a way that already favors no plat-
forming. 
Moreover, defending no platforming by invoking the harm principle involves 
simply accepting the liberal critic’s presupposition that the academic sphere is an 
extension of the public sphere, and thus governed by general free speech princi-
ples. But this presupposition mischaracterizes the nature of universities and the 
norms governing communication within them. As we will argue below, defenders 
of no platforming would do better to reason and argue not in terms of the norms 
of free speech, but the – importantly distinct – norms of academic freedom. 
                                                 
18 There is also a danger here of characterizing the negative effects of hostile speech in a way that makes 
the mere fact of people having disdainful thoughts towards a particular group ipso facto qualify as a harm 
to the members of that group; for discussion, see for instance Simpson (2013a) and Heinze (2016). Con-
versely, for an explicit defence of the view that disdainful thoughts towards an outgroup can in fact be 
harmful in themselves, see Dan-Cohen (1999). 
19 See for instance Lukianoff (2014) and Bindel (2015). 
20 Indeed, one of us has argued for this view (Simpson 2013b). Further to the texts already cited, other 





4. Distinguishing academic freedom and free speech  
The civil libertarians who condemn no platforming routinely characterize the 
university as an institution that should be defined by a commitment to free 
speech. And this seems credible at face value. After all, if the right to free speech 
is to be respected anywhere, shouldn’t it be respected in institutions devoted to 
critical inquiry? To invoke free speech in this context is to invoke a central pillar 
of the liberal tradition: a principle encoded in every major liberal theory of justice, 
enshrined in the constitutional or common law of all liberal societies, and – ac-
cording to various international treaties and declarations – grounded in our inal-
ienable human rights. 
The problem, however, is that this view treats the university as if it were just an 
outlet in the marketplace of ideas or an extension of the public square. This is a 
mischaracterization. Universities are specialized technical institutions that exist 
for purposes of teaching and research. Communicative norms and practices in 
universities reflect these purposes. 
First, they accord special protection to certain kinds of speech by those respon-
sible for teaching and research: “a personal liberty to pursue the investigation, 
research, teaching, and publication of any subject matter of professional interest 
without vocational jeopardy” except in case of “an inexcusable breach of profes-
sional ethics in the exercise of that freedom” (van Alstyne 1972: 71). This freedom 
is needed because the realization of the epistemic aims of teaching and research 
will be compromised if the employment of teacher-scholars depends upon the 
constant grace and favor of university management, society in general or – espe-
cially in the case of state universities – the government (Ibid: 71).21 
In addition, the communicative norms and practices of universities also give rec-
ognized disciplinary experts – that is, academic faculty – various kinds of control 
over the speech of others, as is needed to uphold the intellectual rigors of, and 
thus promote the epistemic aims of, their disciplines. In the public square we tol-
erate the speech of flat-earth cranks, shills paid to undermine climate science, and 
revisionist historians who espouse conspiratorial misreadings of the evidence. As 
                                                 
21 Extramural speech is also often recognized as an element of what is protected by academic freedom. 
The view of Goldstein and Schaffer – that “academic freedom should continue to protect speech in which 
faculty speak as citizens on matters of public concern”, and that no faculty “should be subject to reprisals 
because colleagues, administrators, alumni, or politicians take umbrage at the expression of views on 
subjects of public concern” (2015: 255) – is widely shared. And the American Association of University 
Professors explicitly identifies freedom of extramural speech as one of the core purposes of the institution 
of tenure in its definitive “1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure” (see 
www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf). Conversely, as Post says, there is some difficulty in sustain-
ing this view, given that “extramural speech is by hypothesis unrelated to the special training and exper-
tise of faculty” (2015: 137). We will set aside the issue of whether extramural speech is protected by aca-
demic freedom, as nothing significant in our discussion hinges on it (although see note 26). 
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long as they don’t harass anyone we let them say their piece.22 But such people 
aren’t owed an opportunity to teach History 101 or publish in scientific journals, 
any more than they are owed a platform to address parliament or a corporate 
board meeting. It is permissible for disciplinary gatekeepers to exclude cranks 
and shills from valuable communicative platforms in academic contexts, because 
effective teaching and research requires that communicative privileges be given 
to some and not others, based on people’s disciplinary competence. 
This is what justifies academic disciplines in amplifying the speech of experts and 
marginalizing the speech of non-experts. These processes are ubiquitous and rou-
tine. The professoriate decides which candidates have earned doctoral creden-
tials. Editors of journals and academic presses exercise discretionary judgment to 
decide whose work will be published. The curriculum is set by faculty – not by 
politicians, or the general public – and students work within it. As Post says, ac-
ademic expertise is supported by such practices, which are not just about the 
freedom to inquire, but also about “affirmative disciplinary virtues of methodo-
logical care”, the maintenance of which “quite contradicts the egalitarian toler-
ance that defines the marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment” 
(2013: vii). And thus, whereas in free speech “there is an equality of status in the 
field of ideas”, the pursuit of knowledge in academia demands an inequality of sta-
tus in ideas; it requires “practices that seek to separate true ideas from false ones” 
(Ibid: 9-10). The university would largely be a waste of time for teachers and stu-
dents, and its subsidization a waste of resources for the rest of society, were 
things to be otherwise. 
Communicative practices in universities are not governed, then, by the liberal 
precepts that regulate communication in the public square. When universities 
restrict speakers and viewpoints this should not be, and indeed is not, based 
solely or even primarily on purely procedural standards aimed at harm-preven-
tion. Given that no platforming is a practice that takes place in universities, our 
question should be whether it is compatible with norms of academic freedom in 
particular, where these norms are understood as distinct from general liberal 
principles of free speech. Granted, some of the speaking engagements that no 
platformers target – like commencement addresses, or talks at student societies 
– are not immediately linked to the teaching and research activities that princi-
ples of academic freedom are primarily there to safeguard. But principles of aca-
demic freedom are an appropriate reference point all the same, because these 
other kinds of speaking events are an important part of the cultural and institu-
tional backdrop against which teaching and research activities are conducted. 
                                                 
22 Granted, in some European countries there are legal restrictions on Holocaust denial, whose compati-
bility with liberalism some theorists have defended; for discussion see Whine (2009) and Altman (2012). 
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The norms governing these communicative occasions – as well as attempts to in-
terfere with them – should therefore be guided by consideration of how they af-
fect the university’s core academic activities.23  
What principles of academic freedom are primarily there to uphold, on the un-
derstanding we have sketched above, is a certain kind of independence: independ-
ence in the exercise of technical expertise in teaching and research from the con-
trol of outside actors, like governments, businesses, and administrators, who 
might try to force individuals or departments into “promulgating particular 
views” instead of “sustaining the ongoing scholarly discipline by which 
knowledge is identified and expanded” (Ibid: 89). The aim of these principles is to 
ensure, for instance, that donors cannot get professors fired for criticizing foreign 
governments, that corporations cannot buy influence to quash research that 
threatens their commercial interests, that governments cannot gag scientists 
whose research reveals dangers created by government policies, and that admin-
istrative staff cannot force teachers to modify their syllabi based on the manage-
ment’s ideas about what should be taught. In securing all these protections, 
though, to reiterate, principles of academic freedom do not guarantee teachers or 
students (or anyone else) participation in a wide-open discussion of ideas. On the 
contrary, the standards of expertise that govern teaching and research are com-
patible with all sorts of content-based restrictions on communication. What 
principles of academic freedom are meant to ensure is that such constraints are 
imposed by credentialed disciplinary experts, not outsiders, and that such con-
straints serve the promotion of disciplinary knowledge, not some ulterior agenda 
(Ibid: 85-93). 
Why should we regard the above as a liberal conception of academic freedom? 
Post’s answer is roughly as follows. Free people cannot justifiably be subject to 
the brute authority of elites. Government must involve the people governing 
themselves in order to be legitimate. For Post, this follows from a broader theory 
of free speech grounded in the idea of open democratic participation as an essen-
tial requirement of democratic legitimacy (Post 1990, 2011). The realization of 
self-government is not just a matter of a society having formally democratic elec-
toral and parliamentary institutions. This ideal also requires (i) that everyone 
should be at liberty to participate in the public discourse that underpins demo-
cratic decisions, and (ii) that everyone should have access to the knowledge and 
information necessary for well-informed judgements about how we ought to be 
                                                 
23 Chomsky (2015) adopts a similar stance in his critique of Columbia University over its handling of a 
visiting lecture by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2007. Chomsky argues that Columbia's President Lee Bol-
linger used the occasion to espouse the US State Department’s anti-Iranian propaganda, and that this is 
indicative of a wider pattern of subservience to power by university leaders, one which poses a grave 
threat to academic freedom. On Chomsky’s view, then, public lectures at universities – even when they 
are not directly connected to teaching and research activities – contribute to the culture of the institution, 
and the wider climate of the academic profession in general, in ways that make them amenable to assess-
ment with reference to principles of academic freedom. 
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governed.24 Principles of free speech, which safeguard disliked views against 
viewpoint-based restriction in the public square, serve the first requirement of 
open access and participation. Principles of academic freedom, by contrast, serve 
the second requirement. In order that everyone should have access to the infor-
mation necessary for informed judgements about issues of public concern, socie-
ties need specialized institutions – including an independent university sector – 
devoted to the creation and dissemination of expert knowledge.25 
Post’s account of academic freedom is not the only one available. There are defla-
tionary accounts like the one suggested by Stanley Fish (2014), which say that 
academic freedom is little more than a demand by academics that they be allowed 
to do their job however they like. Principles of academic freedom, thus under-
stood, have little normative purchase on anyone besides the academics whose in-
terests they serve. There are also accounts that characterize academic freedom as 
a specific institutional expression of a more general political principle of freedom 
of thought, instead of something grounded in – and thus potentially limited by – 
claims about the authoritative privileges of experts in academic disciplines (e.g. 
Bromwich 2015). It is also worth noting that principles of academic freedom come 
in different forms, and with different historical underpinnings, in different juris-
dictions (see Barendt 2010). Post’s account of academic freedom is linked to 
broader principles of American constitutional law, and its conception of liberal 
democracy might be seen as idiosyncratic by liberals in other cultural contexts. 
In any case, our argument isn’t that Post’s account of academic freedom is demon-
strably superior to every rival account that might be offered. Our point is that 
Post presents a plausible account of academic freedom, located squarely within a 
liberal politics, and one which opens up a way to see no platforming as in princi-
ple consonant with a liberal understanding of the university’s mission and nature. 
It is no intrinsic affront to the intellectual culture of the university, on this view, 
that a person should be deprived of a platform to express her views because of a 
negative appraisal of her credibility and the content of her views. Principles of 
academic freedom of the kind that Post defends can permit such exclusion, pro-
vided that it respects and supports the independent exercise of disciplinary ex-
pertise in teaching and research. 
Of course this does not yet entail that all or even most instances of no platforming 
will receive the liberal’s approval. What it shows is how such approval can be 
merited. In at least some cases, there is reason to think that the no platforming of 
                                                 
24 This view about the relation between free speech and democracy has its contemporary roots in Mei-
klejohn (1948), and is espoused by free speech theorists like Dworkin (2009) and Weinstein (2011). 
25 This kind of view about the university’s special epistemic role, and its distinctive place in a democratic 
order, is also a feature of so-called institutional theories of free speech (e.g. Horwitz 2013), which propose 
that control over communicative liberties and restrictions should be more widely devolved to social in-
stitutions that have an important stake in public discourse – including universities, the press, and librar-




a particular speaker would positively contribute to an institutional culture that 
protects the exercise of disciplinary expertise against ulterior influences and ex-
ternal agendas, or at the very least, would do nothing to threaten that aspect of 
the institutional culture. The way to make a liberal argument for no platforming, 
then – in the Greer case, the Namazie case, or any other – is to see whether that 
kind of judgement can be sustained in relation to the relevant instance of no plat-
forming. This is the topic of the next section. We also discuss a more radical way 
of using Post’s account of academic freedom to defend no platforming, one that 
involves viewing students, and not just teaching and research faculty, as having a 
legitimate role to play in the formation of disciplinary standards. 
 
5. Easier cases and harder cases 
First, consider the no platforming of an anti-Semitic historical revisionist who 
denies the Holocaust, or an oil company lobbyist who peddles misinformation 
casting doubt on the facts of anthropogenic climate change. The Holocaust denier 
flouts the epistemic and methodological norms that govern historical inquiry. 
The oil company shill flouts the epistemic and methodological norms that govern 
inquiry in climate science and related disciplines. Speakers like these make a joke 
of the intellectual standards to which teaching and research in these disciplines 
aspire. Denying either one of them an opportunity to address a student club, or 
deliver a commencement address, is at least prima facie compatible with respecting 
the independence of disciplinary expertise, since no experts within the university 
would be restricted in their teaching or research practice because of the exclu-
sion. The no platforming of such speakers would thus seem prima face permissible 
under a Post-inspired account of academic freedom, if the aim was to uphold dis-
ciplinary standards.26 But we can go further. Beyond mere permissibility, we may 
have positive reasons to withhold university speaking opportunities from Holo-
caust deniers and climate change shills under a Post-inspired account of academic 
freedom. No single, isolated instance of Holocaust or climate change denial is suf-
ficient to undermine the disciplinary integrity of the history or climate science 
departments. Nevertheless, the intellectual and disciplinary culture of a univer-
sity is shaped by all of the public speaking activities that happen within the in-
stitution. The university that wants to support the independence and integrity of 
its disciplinary experts – that is to say, the university that takes its central epis-
temic purposes seriously – needs to work to cultivate an intellectual culture that 
                                                 
26 It is a more complicated case if the Holocaust denier or oil company shill is a credentialed expert in the 
relevant discipline. If they were invited by their disciplinary peers to address an academic research sem-
inar – say, if the history department unwittingly invited a crank, and then opted not to rescind the invi-
tation – then their no platforming wouldn’t be acceptable under Post’s account. If they were invited to 
address a student club, then the case for the acceptability of them being no platformed would be stronger, 
all else being equal. At minimum, it cannot be the case that the status of these speakers as disciplinary 
experts entails that their academic freedom (or that academic freedom per se) is infringed just because a 
particular student club has not given them a platform to espouse their views. 
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properly recognises and esteems the authority of its disciplinary experts. And this 
plausibly generates a reason for the university to not extend any apparent credi-
bility or symbolic esteem to speakers that fall dramatically short of the intellec-
tual standards that govern its academic disciplines.27 
By a symmetrical line of reasoning, when academic departments invite speakers 
who they recognise as credible practitioners in the relevant field, the no platform-
ing of those speakers would be a clear infringement of academic freedom under 
Post’s account. Consider again the example of an economist who opposes pro-
gressive welfare. Assume that this speaker is a proficient practitioner of her dis-
cipline; while many economists reject her views, nearly all of them accept that she 
is methodologically competent and that her views should be taken seriously. The 
no platforming of this speaker – by a leftwing student group, say – would under-
mine the independent disciplinary expertise of the university’s economists, 
which includes deciding who to invite to speak at research seminars, and would 
thus infringe their academic freedom. It would also undermine the integrity of 
teaching and research in the discipline, by treating as ‘beyond the pale’ a view 
that, according to the discipline’s own standard-bearers, remains viable. 
These are relatively easy cases. Insofar as principles of academic freedom are 
meant to protect the exercise of disciplinary expertise from external interference, 
they will condemn no platforming when it is used to override or undermine the 
prerogatives of disciplinary experts, and permit or favor it, other things being 
equal, when it is used to support the authority of disciplinary experts, by exclud-
ing speakers whose incompetence would undermine that authority. 
Granted, other things aren’t always equal. Another important factor is how, after 
student agitation initiates a no platforming campaign, the decision to disinvite a 
speaker is made. At one end of the spectrum there will be cases in which respect 
for disciplinary expertise is clearly demonstrated: a crank historian is invited to 
deliver a commencement address, student agitation alerts management to the 
controversial status of their invitee, and then management defers to its own ex-
perts in the history department to decide whether, according to their disciplinary 
standards, the offer of a speaking platform for this invitee should be honored. In 
these cases the process of disinvitation does nothing to unravel the kind of justi-
fication for no platforming that we have presented. But there are cases at the other 
end of the spectrum, in which little or no respect is paid to disciplinary expertise, 
                                                 
27 These sorts of epistemic aims are sometimes – contrary to what opponents of no platforming often 
suggest – part of the motivation for no platforming. For instance, when Ben Stein (a writer, actor, and 
outspoken critic of evolutionary theory) was disinvited from delivering a commencement address at the 
University of Vermont in 2009, the University President Dan Fogel stated that the decision was driven 
by concerns about “whether someone who holds views antithetical to scientific inquiry should be hon-
ored as commencement speaker” (Links 2009). In this instance Fogel was seeking to uphold the intellec-
tual standards of the University of Vermont – and in particular, the standards relevant to teaching and 
research in biology and related disciplines – by withdrawing a speaking opportunity that would have 
conferred credibility and symbolic esteem on a speaker who patently flouted those standards. 
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with faculty being cut out of the decision-making process about whether to dis-
invite speakers, as part of a pattern of their marginalization in university govern-
ance more generally. This is indicative of a deeper ambivalence in relations be-
tween faculty and management around issues of academic freedom. Sometimes 
management is the party threatening its faculty’s academic freedom, at other 
times it plays a vital role protecting academic freedom and preserving the inde-
pendence of its faculty (see Scott 2015).  
What about harder cases? One kind of hard case is where there exists deep disa-
greement – either intradisciplinary or interdisciplinary – over whether a particular 
speaker possesses disciplinary competence of a relevant kind. Consider again the 
no platforming of Germaine Greer as discussed in §2. Disciplines in the humani-
ties and social sciences that are heavily influenced by feminist theory are riven by 
deep theoretical divides, not just over the question of whether trans women meet 
the necessary metaphysical conditions (whatever they may be) to properly count 
as women, but also over whether that question is a legitimate object of inquiry. 
Some scholars with apparent institutional and disciplinary credibility – in fields 
like cultural studies, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, gender studies, and 
queer studies – will insist that the questions of what a woman is and whether 
trans women qualify are central to feminist inquiry. Others scholars in those same 
fields, with similar credentials, will insist that the question has been settled and 
is no longer reasonably treated as open to inquiry.28 Given this backdrop, it is 
contestable whether the no platforming of someone like Greer, who denies the 
womanhood of trans women, could be understood as consistent with respect for 
academic freedom under the account we have presented. The fact that there is 
live controversy over the relevant standards in the relevant disciplines suggests, 
on its face, that there are not any authoritative disciplinary standards that can be 
invoked in order to characterize Greer’s no platforming as a case of someone be-
ing excluded for lacking disciplinary competence. Having said that, disciplinary 
controversies sometimes resolve. At some point it may cease to be a matter of 
controversy – among experts with broadly comparable credentials in relevant 
disciplines – whether Greer’s view represents some kind of failure of disciplinary 
competence. If ascendant trends in feminist theory continue, it is possible that 
Greer’s trans-exclusionary views might one day be rejected by all credentialed 
experts in the relevant humanities or social science disciplines. But this clearly is 
not where things stand at this point in time. Consequently, a Post-inspired ac-
count of academic freedom would tend to see the no platforming of someone like 
Greer as a hard case, given that the governing disciplinary standards in this arena 
remain deeply contested. 
Another kind of hard case stems from controversies between disciplines. In gen-
der studies the moral permissibility of homosexuality is a settled question – one 
                                                 
28 For discussion of these issues see Heyes (2006), Bettcher (2014), Jenkins (2015), and Reilly-Cooper 
(2016). On the rejection of the very notion of a ‘trans debate’, see Lees (2016). 
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of the axiomatic premises that sets a foundation for the kind of inquiry that schol-
ars in this discipline undertake. Anyone who wanted to argue against the moral 
permissibility of homosexuality would be setting themselves outside the axioms 
that define the field of gender studies. And although this view isn’t universally 
accepted in the wider community, the fact that an academic discipline carries 
such axiomatic commitments isn’t necessarily a problem. Indeed, principles of 
academic freedom in general support similar kinds of disciplinary commitments. 
As Michele Moody-Adams says 
Communities of academic inquiry are constituted by exclusionary practices… 
and standards of argument and inquiry evolve as shared understandings that 
are internal to these exclusive “communities of the competent”. These shared 
understandings involve the notion that some ways of arguing, and some 
points of view, are simply not worthy of recognition within the community of 
inquiry. A responsible academic is thus by definition committed… to the or-
thodoxies that define communities of competent inquirers and underwrite 
standards for inquiry carried out in those communities (Moody-Adams 2015: 
106) 
Problems arise, though, insofar as different communities of academic inquiry have 
different axiomatic commitments. While the moral permissibility of homosexu-
ality is a settled question in gender studies, it is regarded as an open question by 
a sizeable portion of those with recognized disciplinary competence and institu-
tional credibility in disciplines like theology and philosophy. There are similar 
interdisciplinary gulfs related to questions like the moral permissibility of abor-
tion, infanticide, and eugenics, gender and racial equality, the labor theory of 
value, whether inductive inference is justified, and whether objective inquiry is 
possible. In some disciplines these questions are seen as legitimate objects of in-
quiry. In others they are seen as settled, sometimes axiomatically.29 It is a complex 
question, then, whether the no platforming of speakers who treat these questions 
as open – like, say, a philosopher who argues for the wrongness of homosexuality 
– can be defended, in principle, under a Post-inspired account of academic free-
dom. Although the exclusion of this speaker wouldn’t undermine, and indeed 
may support, the intellectual culture and disciplinary integrity of the gender 
studies department, it would likely undermine the disciplinary culture and integ-
rity of the philosophy department.30 
                                                 
29 Compare these hard cases with the easy case of the Holocaust denier. It is a mark of elementary disci-
plinary competence in historical studies to accept that the question of whether the Holocaust occurred 
is to all intents and purposes closed, and that anyone who thinks it is open is ignorant or confused (or 
worse). But unlike the hard cases, no other discipline is committed to the denial of these points. 
30 These interdisciplinary conflicts are further complicated by debates over which fields of inquiry qualify 
as academic disciplines properly construed. Special prerogatives are accorded to academics, on Post’s ac-
count, because they are required in order for academics to carry out the rigorous, technical, and special-
ized intellectual practices that are conducive to knowledge-creation within their disciplines. Post’s the-
ory, like the institutional form of academic freedom in the United States that it seeks to theorize, owes a 
heavy debt to the ideals of the German university of the 19th century, with disciplines of inquiry geared 
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It is interesting to note the special position that philosophy occupies in such in-
terdisciplinary conflicts, and the implications of this for no platforming and aca-
demic freedom. As philosophers we like to see everything as ‘up for grabs’. That 
self-image is less true in practice than we sometimes think. A contemporary phi-
losopher defending slavery would probably (and rightly) be dismissed by his col-
leagues out of hand. But there is some truth in our self-image all the same. Many 
questions that are regarded as closed or settled in other disciplines – especially 
moral and political questions – remain open in philosophy. If philosophy by its 
nature is a discipline in which most questions always remain open in principle, 
then there will inevitably be conflicts in disciplinary norms and standards be-
tween philosophy and other disciplines, of precisely the kind that generate hard 
cases in thinking about the permissibility of no platforming. One way to address 
these hard cases would be to say that any speaker seen as within the bounds of 
disciplinary competence by at least one discipline cannot be legitimately no plat-
formed for the sake of upholding the disciplinary standards of any other disci-
pline. But then the worry is that in protecting the disciplinary integrity of philos-
ophy – as a discipline resistant to seeing any views as rationally beyond the pale 
– we impair other disciplines’ attempts to police their own intellectual standards. 
We could, of course, privilege philosophy’s disciplinary standards and practices 
over all other disciplines. But if we want to avoid this, then the bare fact that a 
philosopher might defend the view that p should not be seen as implying that 
other disciplines are unjustified in regarding support for p as a mark of discipli-
nary incompetence. 
We should also note that our argument presupposes that normative moral and 
political claims – e.g. about the permissibility of homosexuality, or slavery, or the 
rights of trans people – can be the proper objects of disciplinary expertise. We 
cannot offer a full defence of this assumption, but it seems defensible on its face. 
Some disciplines do in fact treat moral and normative political claims as matters 
of disciplinary expertise, as we have already discussed. And we think it is prima 
facie plausible that someone who has disciplinary expertise in studying the his-
tory of slavery, say, will be better-placed to think about the moral permissibility 
of slavery, other things being equal, than someone who does not. Moreover, all 
                                                 
around “the determined, methodical, and independent search for truth” (Stone 2015: 4). The point is that 
being a bona fide discipline in the way that matters is not just about having a nominated field of inquiry 
and a named department in the university. It is about having distinct disciplinary methods that create 
knowledge, and merit special protection in view of that achievement. Where there are conflicts between 
different disciplines – say, conflicts over different methods, or axiomatic commitments – this should only 
be understood as a true conflict if both fields are alike in being able to claim the status of a knowledge-
creating discipline in the relevant sense. Naturally, all disciplines make such claims on their own behalf. 
And in the humanities and social sciences especially, it is hard to non-chauvinistically adjudicate disputes 
about such claims that run across disciplinary lines. (Although see Leiter 2017 for an attempt to carry out 
such adjudication across disciplinary lines.) The fact that disputes about a speaker’s disciplinary creden-
tials can ramify out into these deeper interdisciplinary conflicts is another respect in which the types of 
cases we are describing here should be seen as genuinely hard cases. 
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disciplines worth the name either explicitly or tacitly treat certain normative ep-
istemic commitments to be axiomatic and constitutive of disciplinary competence. 
It is true that claims to moral forms of disciplinary expertise are open to abuse by 
academics. But so too are claims to non-moral forms of disciplinary expertise, as 
when biological research is used to defend claims about racial superiority. All this 
gives us reason to allow that normative moral and political claims can be proper 
objects of disciplinary expertise. If this is mistaken, it is up to the opponent of no 
platforming to explain why.  
The fact that there are cases of no platforming whose in principle justifiability is 
hard to assess, under the account of academic freedom that we are proposing here, 
is not a good reason to reject that account. On the contrary, we see it as a merit of 
our account that it offers a theoretical explanation of what it is that makes the 
hard cases hard. The deep controversy surrounding the no platforming of some-
one like Greer, on our view, is not about whether we prioritize academic freedom 
over other considerations. The controversy is, at least in part, about who gets to 
claim and wield disciplinary authority. The controversy is about who gets to de-
cide which views are disciplinary axioms, such that dissenting voices can be ex-
cluded, not in violation of principles of academic freedom, but – as with the exclu-
sion of incompetent historical revisionists, or pseudoscientific charlatans – in a 
way that is partly backed by those principles. 
We have been discussing how, given a certain interpretation of Post’s account of 
academic freedom, certain uses of no platforming may be permissible or sup-
ported where the exclusion of a speaker would positively promote, or at least 
wouldn’t threaten, the independent exercise of disciplinary expertise within the 
university. But there remains another more radical way to use Post’s account of 
academic freedom to formulate a defence no platforming, albeit one that Post 
would likely resist. Suppose we think of no platforming as something relevantly 
similar to practices like peer review, syllabus-setting, and doctoral accreditation, 
which, among their other functions, partly serve to mark out the boundaries of 
what is legitimate, acceptable, or axiomatic within an academic discipline. If no 
platforming were a practice carried out by fully credentialed researchers and 
teachers, then this conception would be easier to defend. However, as previously 
noted, no platforming is usually led by students. And on the normal understand-
ing of the matter, students are not disciplinary experts; “they are novices, under 
the intellectual tutelage of the faculty”, and because they do not play an important 
role in the creation of disciplinary knowledge, principles of academic freedom do 
not assign students any special communicative protections or prerogatives 
(Goldstein and Schaffer: 256). 
Contrary to this standard view of things, however, it is possible to think that stu-
dents do have a role to play in the shaping of disciplinary standards, even if not 
the same role as faculty. For one thing, some students – graduate students – are 
also usually researchers and teachers. It is not unheard of for faculty to seek their 
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advice on appointments, or to allow them a sizeable role in setting syllabi and 
evaluating student performance. Many graduate students also publish in aca-
demic journals, deliver conference papers, and act as journal referees. In other 
words, graduate students are expected to act out their disciplinary expertise, 
even if the scope for their doing so is more limited than it is for fully-fledged re-
searchers and teachers. If graduate students in this position choose to no platform 
a speaker on the grounds that, by their lights, the speaker flouts disciplinary 
norms, then this could be viewed as an exercise of a kind of incipient disciplinary 
expertise, meriting some consideration under principles of academic freedom. 
Even with those students who are only students – that is, undergraduates – a case 
could be made for their having some role to play in the formation of disciplinary 
standards. Researchers and teachers are disciplinary experts, but they are not in-
fallible gurus. They are dogged by inherited prejudices and biases, both conscious 
and unconscious, and are sometimes driven by disciplinary inertia and methodo-
logical conservatism. Particularly in social science and humanities disciplines, 
strongly held views among undergraduates – people concerned with the same 
sphere of knowledge and modes of inquiry as their teachers, but not inducted as 
expert practitioners of their field – can sometimes offer a useful corrective to 
these tendencies, by seeking inclusion of unduly ignored views in campaigns for 
curriculum expansion, or more controversially, by demanding less attention be 
given to views that should in fact no longer be taken seriously, for example 
through no platforming. One way this is borne out is when disciplinary experts 
embrace and carry out the reshaping of their disciplinary methods, canons, and 
axioms, in response to calls for change that started out as student-led agitation 
for disciplinary reform. When it comes to some disciplinary questions – e.g. 
whether a syllabus is sufficiently representative of views in the field, or whether 
feminism should be epistemically tolerant of trans-exclusionary positions – some 
students, in part because they are less entrenched in disciplinary orthodoxy, may 
be in a better position to address them than some of their teachers. 
Our contention, then, is that given certain other premises, student activism aimed 
at influencing disciplinary practices could in principle receive some support un-
der an extended version of the account of academic freedom we have presented. 
This is not premised on students having a right to influence their disciplines. Ra-
ther, it is based on the thought that the epistemic aims of (at least some) disci-
plines may be furthered by recognizing the salutary role of students in shaping 
them. Of course there is no guarantee than a given instance of student-led no plat-
forming will promote the epistemic aims of a discipline, just as there is no a priori 
guarantee that any particular syllabus will promote such aims. And precisely how 
the input and expectations of students should be constrained by the disciplinary 
authority of fully-fledged teachers and researchers is a complex issue. The point 
is simply that no platforming is a practice that student groups can use to try to 
exert influence on the culture, standards, and axioms of their disciplines, and that 
it is not absurd to think that attempts to exert such influence might receive some 
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Critics of no platforming argue that the practice is at odds with a liberal commit-
ment to free speech. Defenders of the practice typically respond by invoking the 
harm principle, which is, on a standard liberal view, the most natural way to de-
fend limits on free speech. But this line of defence is premised on a suite of theo-
retical and empirical claims that limit its utility. Moreover, it simply accepts the 
liberal critic’s presupposition that the academy is an extension of the public 
sphere, and is therefore governed by general free speech principles. What we have 
offered here is an alternative way of reconciling at least some instances of no plat-
forming with liberal principles. Our proposal builds on Post’s account of aca-
demic freedom, as something entirely different from a mere extrapolation of free 
speech principles into the realm of the university. Principles of academic freedom, 
unlike principles of free speech, positively support the exclusion of speakers and 
viewpoints for content-based – rather than merely procedural – reasons. These 
exclusions are justified, indeed, they are necessary, in order for researchers and 
teachers to uphold disciplinary standards and exercise their disciplinary exper-
tise free from undue external interference. The exclusion of speakers because of 
their views is thus not in principle antithetical to the aims and nature of the uni-
versity, as some liberal commentators say. At least in some cases, no platforming 
can be compatible with, and even support, these aims. 
We conclude by noting that under the kind of account that we have been 
working with, there are graver threats to academic freedom than anything arising 
out of progressive student activism. No platforming, trigger warnings, safe 
spaces, and calls for curriculum reform are the bugbears of some self-appointed 
champions of academic freedom. But in the end they may distract from more po-
tent threats to the independence of academic experts from outside influences. 
When it comes to political interference in academic research, threats from the 
pro-Israel lobby31 or the anti-climate science lobby32 seem to exert much more 
pressure than student activists. And when it comes to factors that passively in-
centivize academics to direct their research away from some topics and towards 
others, the influence of corporate sponsorship, private grant-making bodies, and 
government research agendas is stronger, and in some cases more pernicious, than 
                                                 
31 For instance, when the University of Illinois withdrew a job offer to Steven Salaita due to pressure 
exerted by donors after Salaita’s outspoken criticism of Israel came to light; see Jaschik (2014). For a 
broader discussion of the Israel lobby and its attempts to undermine academic freedom, see Mearsheimer 
(2015).  
32 For instance, the widespread gagging of scientific researchers by Stephen Harper’s Conservative Gov-
ernment in Canada through the 2000s and early 2010s; for general discussion see Turner (2014).  
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the influence exerted by students. Student activists can be easy targets for criti-
cism, but this is not a good reason to be especially engrossed by them, especially 
when there are other more urgent threats to the academic integrity of the univer-
sity. In that context, the civil libertarians’ preoccupation with student activism 
is at best a distraction, and at worst a misrepresentation of what academic free-
dom really consists in, and what needs to be done to protect it. 
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